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The relationship between the quantum bit commitment (QBC) and quantum seal (QS) is stud-
ied. It is elaborated that QBC and QS are not equivalent, but QS protocols satisfying a stronger
unconditional security requirement can lead to an unconditionally secure QBC. In this sense, QS
is strictly stronger than QBC in security requirements. Based on an earlier proposal on sealing a
single bit, a feasible QBC protocol is also put forward, which is secure in practice even if the cheater
has a strong quantum computational power.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment (BC) is a cryptographic task between
two participants Alice and Bob. It normally includes
two phases. In the commit phase, Alice has in mind a
bit (b = 0 or 1) which she wants to commit to Bob, and
she sends him a piece of evidence. Later, in the unveil
phase, Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks it
with the evidence. A BC protocol is said to be binding
if Alice cannot change the value of b after the commit
phase, and is said to be concealing if Bob cannot know
b before the unveil phase. A secure BC protocol needs
to be both binding and concealing. Quantum bit com-
mitment (QBC) [1] is known to be an essential element
for building more complicated “post-cold-war era” multi-
party cryptographic protocols, e.g., quantum coin tossing
and quantum oblivious transfer [2, 3]. Unfortunately, ac-
cording to the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem
[4, 5], unconditionally secure QBC does not seem to ex-
ist in principle. On the other hand, quantum seals (QS)
are relatively new to quantum cryptography. Its goal can
be summarized as follows. Alice, the owner of the secret
data to be sealed, encodes the data with quantum states.
Any reader Bob can obtain the data from these states
without the help of Alice, while reading the data should
be detectable by Alice. A QS protocol is considered to be
secure if it possesses the following feature: Bob cannot
escape Alice’s detection once he reads the data, namely,
Bob is unable to read the data if he wants to escape Al-
ice’s detection. QS can be classified by the types and the
readability of the sealed data. If the data is a classical bit,
it is called quantum bit seals (QBS). Else if the data is a
classical string, it is called quantum string seals (QSS). If
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the data can always be obtained by the reader with cer-
tainty, it is called a perfect QS. Else if the data can only
be obtained with a small but non-vanished error rate, it
is an imperfect QS. The first perfect QBS protocol was
proposed by Bechmann-Pasquinucci [6], but then it was
proven that all perfect QBS ones are insecure against col-
lective measurements [7]. Shortly later, it was also found
that imperfect QBS has security limits [8]. Nevertheless,
the imperfect QSS can be secure [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
More intriguingly, it was proposed in Ref. [9] that secure
QSS can be utilized to realize a kind of QBS, which is
secure in practice.
Though QBC and QS may look like irrelevant at the
first glance, here we elaborate that they are closely re-
lated. More rigorously, it will be shown below that a QBS
protocol satisfying certain security conditions can lead to
an unconditionally secure QBC. Based on the method of
realizing QBS with QSS in Ref. [9], a new QBC proto-
col is obtained. A most intriguing feature of this QBC
protocol is that the present QBS protocol enables the se-
cret data to be decoded with common senses of human
being, thus it is very easy for an honest participant. On
the contrary, a dishonest participant cannot fulfill the
coherent attacks even if he has a very powerful quan-
tum computer that can perform any kind of quantum
operations and measurements. Instead, he needs also a
knowledge base that has almost all knowledge of human
culture, and his quantum computer needs to have a high
level of artificial intelligence to handle these knowledge.
This is impossible not only for current technology, but
also is less likely in practice even in the future, because
human intelligence seems to contain non-computable ele-
ments [15]. In this sense, the present QBC protocol may
be viewed as “practically secure”. Moreover, this QBC
is quite feasible. Thus it is possible to build more com-
plicated QBC-based multi-party cryptographic protocols
and to enjoy the advantage of quantum cryptography in
practice, even though the MLC no-go theorem is still
2there.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
QUANTUM BIT COMMITMENT AND
QUANTUM SEALS
For a QBS protocol with a known error rate ε, we can
build a QBC protocol as follows (note that in this section,
the names Alice and Bob are called contrarily to those
in the description of QS in the Introduction, because the
QBS protocol is executed in the reverse direction in the
QBC protocols below).
The Basic Protocol
The commit phase:
(1) Bob randomly chooses s bits xi (i = 1, ..., s), and
seals each bit into a quantum register ψi (i = 1, ..., s)
with the QBS protocol. Then he sends these quantum
registers to Alice.
(2) Alice randomly choosesm of the quantum registers
and decodes their corresponding sealed bits. She checks
if the values of these m sealed bits are random. She also
asks Bob to reveal the values of the sealed bits for thesem
quantum registers to check if they match the values she
decoded within the error rate ε. If no suspicious result
was found, Alice and Bob discard the data for these m
quantum registers and proceed.
(3) Alice randomly chooses one of the remaining s−m
quantum registers (suppose that it is ψi0 ), decodes the
sealed bit xi0 , and leaves the rest s − m − 1 quantum
registers unmeasured. Now she has in mind the value of
the bit b she wants to commit, and announces to Bob the
value of a = xi0 ⊕ b.
The unveil phase:
(4) Alice announces to Bob the value of the commit
bit b and i0, and sends Bob all the s−m−1 unmeasured
quantum registers.
(5) Bob uses the value xi0 he sealed in ψi0 to check
whether a = xi0 ⊕ b, and he checks whether the s−m−1
quantum registers Alice returns him in this phase are
indeed unmeasured, i.e., the corresponding sealed bits
have not been decoded. He accepts Alice’s commitment
as honest if no suspicious result was found.
This protocol is concealing because Bob cannot know
i0 before the unveil phase, since Alice’s announcing a
provides him 1 bit of information only, while locating i0
requires log2(s −m − 1) bits of information. Therefore
Bob does not know xi0 so he cannot infer the value of the
commit bit b from Alice’s announced a, as long as each
xi has the equal probabilities to be 0 or 1 (that is why
Alice needs to check in step (2) whether the values of
the sealed bits are random). It is also binding because if
Alice wants to change the value of b in the unveil phase,
she has to find another quantum register ψi1 whose sealed
bit is xi1 = x¯i0 , and sends ψi0 to Bob as an unmeasured
quantum register in step (5). But if the QBS protocol
used in this QBC protocol is secure, Bob will detect that
the bit sealed in ψi0 has already been decoded, and catch
Alice cheating.
However, Alice can apply the following weak cheating
strategy. She measures no register in step (3), and an-
nounces a random value as a. Then in the unveil phase,
she randomly chooses a register as ψi0 , and determines
what value of b can be announced in step (4) according
to the decoding result of her current measurement on ψi0
and the value of a she previously announced. This may
not be considered as a “real” cheating because Alice can-
not announce b at her will in the unveil phase. It is like
tossing a coin and decide the value of b by the head or
tail. But on the other hand, it is also true that the proto-
col cannot limit Alice to honest behaviors because she is
not forced to make up her mind on the value of b during
the commit phase. To fix this problem, we can further
improve the protocol.
The Advanced Protocol
The commit phase:
(i) Alice and Bob agree on the security parameters s,
m and n (n << s−m), and a Boolean matrix G as the
generating matrix of a binary linear (n, k, d)-code C [16].
(ii) The same as steps (1) and (2) of the basic protocol.
(iii) Alice randomly chooses n of the remaining s −
m quantum registers. Suppose that they are ψj (j =
i1, i2, ..., in, i1 < i2 < ... < in). She decodes each of the
bit xj sealed in these n registers, and leaves the rest s−
m− n quantum registers unmeasured. Thus she obtains
a classical n-bit string x = (xi1xi2 ...xin).
(iv) Alice chooses a non-zero random n-bit string r =
(r1r2...rn) ∈ {0, 1}
n and announces it to Bob;
(v) Now Alice has in mind the value of the bit b that
she wants to commit. She chooses an n-bit codeword
c = (c1c2...cn) from C such that c⊙ r = b (Here c⊙ r ≡
n⊕
i=1
ci ∧ ri);
(vi) Alice announces to Bob c′ = c⊕ x.
The unveil phase:
(vii) Alice announces to Bob the value of the commit
bit b and i1, i2, ..., in, and sends Bob all the s − m − n
unmeasured quantum registers.
(viii) Bob uses the values xj he sealed in ψj (j =
i1, i2, ..., in) to obtain c from c
′ = c ⊕ x, and checks
whether c is indeed a codeword from C and c⊙r = b. He
also checks whether the s−m− n quantum registers Al-
ice sends him in this phase are indeed unmeasured, and
accepts Alice’s commitment as honest if no suspicious
result was found.
The intuition behind this protocol is that if Alice wants
to keep the value of b undetermined in the commit phase
by measuring less than n registers in step (iii), she has
3to announce c′ randomly in step (vi) since she does not
know x. Then in step (vii) of the unveil phase, she has to
find the correct indices i1, i2, ..., in to announce, so that
the data x = (xi1xi2 ...xin) sealed in ψj (j = i1, i2, ..., in)
ensures that c′⊕x is a codeword from C. Generally, if she
randomly chooses n indices to announce while leaving the
rest s−m−n quantum registers completely unmeasured,
the probability is trivial for the value of x thus obtained
to be exactly what needed. The question is whether the
following strategy can be successful: In the unveil phase,
Alice randomly chooses n quantum registers and mea-
sures them with collective measurements instead of indi-
vidual measurements, so that they can be less disturbed
if their sealed data is not the desired x. Then Alice can
repeat the procedure with other sets of n registers, until
she finally finds the set in which the desired x is sealed.
In this case, whether the above QBC protocol is secure
or not will be determined by how much disturbance is
caused by Alice’s collective measurements. That is, it is
determined by the security level of the QBS protocol used
in step (ii). To find out how secure this QBS needs to be,
let us first review the classification of definitions of secu-
rity of cryptographic protocols. Currently, the following
two definitions of security are widely adopted [4].
Perfect security:
When the other participant(s) is (are) honest, the
amount of extra information (other than what is allowed
by the protocol) obtained by the dishonest participant(s)
is exactly zero.
Unconditional security:
When the other participant(s) is (are) honest, the
amount of extra information obtained by the dishonest
participant(s) can be made arbitrarily small by increas-
ing the security parameter(s) of the protocol.
Obviously when perfectly secure QBS protocols are
used in Advanced Protocol, it will result in an uncondi-
tionally secure QBC. What we are interested is whether
unconditionally secure QBS protocols are useful too.
Note that the above definition of unconditional security is
equivalent to: when the other participant(s) is (are) hon-
est, the probability for a dishonest participant to obtain
non-trivial amount of extra information while escaping
the detection can be made arbitrarily small by increas-
ing the security parameter(s) of the protocol. However, it
was left blank in this definition whether the probability
for a dishonest participant to escape the detection can
be made arbitrarily small if he obtains trivial amount of
extra information only. To be rigorous, here we propose
an independent definition for a kind of unconditionally
secure protocols which satisfies stricter security require-
ment.
Strong unconditional security:
When the amount of extra information obtained by
a dishonest participant is f(n) (here f(n) is a function
whose value decreases as the security parameter(s) n of
the protocol increases), the probability for him to escape
the detection by the honest participant(s) is o(αf(n)).
Here the constant α satisfies 0 < α < 1.
Now let us see what difference will be made when dif-
ferent kinds of unconditionally secure QBS protocols are
used in the above Advanced QBC Protocol. Suppose that
Alice applies the cheating strategy mentioned above. She
measures no quantum registers in the commit phase. In
the unveil phase, she randomly chooses n registers and
measures them with collective measurements. If it turns
out that the data sealed in these registers is exactly the
desired x that could lead to the value of b she wants
to unveil, then her cheating is successful. Else she tries
again with another set of n registers. Note that in the
latter case, she merely knows that the data sealed in the
first n registers she measured is not x, while she does not
know what exactly the sealed data is. Thus the amount
of information she obtained is merely f(n). If general
unconditionally secure QBS protocols are adopted which
do not satisfy the strong unconditional security condi-
tion, Alice can escape the detection with a probability
not less than O(αf(n)). Suppose that it averagely takes
t times for Alice to perform collective measurements on
different sets of n registers until she finds the desired n
registers which give the outcome x she is looking for.
Since the goal of Alice is to commit 1 bit of information,
we have tf(n) ∼ O(1), i.e., tf(n) has a finite non-trivial
value. Then the probability for Alice to escape the detec-
tion will be not less than [O(αf(n))]t ∼ O(αtf(n)), which
also remains finite instead of being trivial as n increases.
Thus we come to the conclusion that unconditionally se-
cure QBS which does not satisfy the strong unconditional
security condition does not necessarily lead to uncondi-
tionally secure QBC through the above Advance Proto-
col.
On the other hand, if strong unconditionally secure
QS protocols are adopted in Advanced Protocol, when-
ever Alice measures n registers and obtains f(n) bits of
information, she can escape the detection with probabil-
ity o(αf(n)) only. That is, when she finally finds the n
registers she is looking for and thus obtains finite non-
trivial amount of information, the probability for her to
escape the detection will be ∼ o(αtf(n)), which does not
remain finite. Instead, it drops arbitrarily close to zero as
n increases. Consequently, the resultant QBC protocol
is unconditionally secure. Therefore we reach one of the
main result of this paper: strong unconditionally secure
QBS can lead to unconditionally secure QBC.
It is natural to ask a further question whether strong
unconditionally secure QBS and unconditionally secure
QBC are equivalent. So far, to our best knowledge, no
unconditionally secure QBS protocol based on uncondi-
tionally secure QBC (no matter it exists or not) was ever
proposed. It is also worth noting that the definitions of
QBS and QBC indicate a significant different feature be-
tween them. In the final stage of QBC, Alice needs to
4unveil to Bob what she committed, i.e., classical commu-
nication is needed. On the contrary, in QBS Alice can
check whether the sealed data was decoded or not at any
time, with or without the classical communication from
Bob. Therefore it seems reasonable that an uncondition-
ally secure QBS protocol based on unconditionally secure
QBC does not exist at all. For these reasons, we tend
to believe that strong unconditionally secure QBS and
unconditionally secure QBC are not equivalent. Strong
unconditionally secure QBS is strictly stronger than un-
conditionally secure QBC in security requirements.
III. PRACTICALLY SECURE QUANTUM BIT
COMMITMENT PROTOCOL
In Ref. [8], a model of QBS was proposed and it was
proven that any QBS satisfying this model cannot be un-
conditionally secure. To date, the model seems to cover
all QBS protocols within our current imagination. Con-
sequently, before we can come up with a protocol which
satisfies the definition of QBS exactly while is not cov-
ered by that model, unconditionally secure QBS does not
seems to exist in principle. Therefore no QBS can lead
to unconditionally secure QBC via the above Advanced
Protocol. Nevertheless, it was shown in Ref. [9] that un-
conditionally secure QSS exits, and it can lead to QBS
which is secure in practice. Therefore we can use this
QBS to realize a kind of QBC which is also secure in
practice.
Let us briefly review the QSS and QBS protocols pro-
posed in Ref. [9]. Let Θ (0 < Θ ≪ pi/4) and α
(0 < α < 1/2) be two fixed constants. The proposed
QSS protocol is as follows.
Sealing: To seal a classical N -bit string b = b1b2...bN
(bi ∈ {0, 1}), Alice randomly chooses θi (−Θ/N
α 6 θi 6
Θ/Nα) and encodes each bit bi with a qubit in the state
|ψi〉 = cos θi |bi〉 + sin θi
∣∣b¯i
〉
. She makes these n qubits
publicly accessible to the reader, while keeping all θi (i =
1, ..., N) secret.
Reading: When Bob wants to read the string b, he
simply measures each qubit in the computational basis
{|0〉 , |1〉}, and denotes the outcome as |b′i〉. He takes the
string b′ = b′1b
′
2...b
′
N as b.
Checking: At any time, Alice can check whether the
sealed string b has been read by trying to project the i-th
qubit (i = 1, ..., N) into cos θi |bi〉+sin θi
∣∣b¯i
〉
. If all the N
qubits can be projected successfully, she concludes that
the string b is still unread. Otherwise if any of the qubits
fails, she knows that b is read.
This protocol can achieve the following goal: each bit
sealed by Alice can be read correctly by Bob, except with
a probability not greater than ε ≡ sin2(Θ/Nα). Thus by
increasing N , the maximal reading error rate ε can be
made arbitrarily small. Meanwhile, the total probability
for Bob to obtain K bits of information while escaping
the detection is bounded by
P 6 2−K
N∏
i=1
2 cos2 θi, (1)
which drops exponentially as K → N , and vanishes when
N → ∞ as long as 0 < α < 1/2. Thus the protocol is
unconditionally secure in principle.
This QSS protocol can be utilized to seal a single bit.
The method is to turn the sealed bit into a string by
adding redundant information. There are many ways
to accomplish this. In the simplest case, we can map
some global properties of the string, e.g., the parity or
the weight, into the bit we want to seal. But since such
kinds of mapping is easy to be formulated mathemati-
cally, a cheater with a powerful quantum computer can
construct a proper collective measurement correspond-
ing to the mapping, and reads the sealed bit with the
strategy proposed in Ref. [8] so that he can escape the
detection with a non-trivial probability. Hence the pro-
tocol is easy to be broken. But in practice, we can make
it more difficult to know the rule of the mapping dis-
honestly than to do so honestly. One of such methods
is to translate the sentences describing the rules of the
mapping into a classical binary bit string, and seal it as
a part of the sealed string so that the cheater does not
know the mapping before decoding the string.
For example, Alice can first encode the following sen-
tence into a classical binary bit string
“Measure the last two qubits in the basis
{cos 15◦ |0〉+ sin 15◦ |1〉 ,− sin 15◦ |0〉+ cos 15◦ |1〉}
and you will know the value of the sealed bit from
their parity. Other qubits following this sentence
are all dummy qubits . You can simply leave them
alone.”
Then she seals it with our QSS protocol, and provides
Bob the qubits encoding this sentence, followed by a large
number of qubits where only the last two are actually
useful.
We must point out that this bit sealing method is still
insecure in principle. This is because any given classical
N -bit string can be decoded into one specific sentence
only, and the meaning of the sentence will lead to a value
of the sealed bit unambiguously. As long as a dishon-
est Bob knows the length N of the sealed string, he can
study all the 2N possible classical N -bit strings, decode
them into sentences, and divide these sentences into two
subsets corresponding to the two possible value of the
sealed bit (of course there will also be tons of meaning-
less sentences and even random sequences of bits that
cannot be decoded as sentences. Bob can simply leave
them alone). Then as described in Ref. [8], he needs
not to know the content of the sealed sentence exactly.
He simply constructs a proper collective measurement to
determine which subset the sentence belongs to. Thus
5he will know the sealed bit from the N qubits without
disturbing them seriously.
Nevertheless, if N is sufficiently large, the number of
possible sentences will be enormous. There could be sen-
tences as simple as
“It is 0. Ignore the rest qubits .”
But there are also sentences like
“Decode the bits following this sentence as a
bitmap image and count the parity of the
number of females .”
and followed by the bits encoding an image of animals,
or famous cartoon icons, or a picture as shown in Fig. 1.
For an honest participant who does not mind disturbing
the quantum state sealing the string, he can simply de-
code the whole string and learn the value of the sealed
bit easily. But for a dishonest participant who wants to
keep the quantum state less disturbed so that he can es-
cape the detection, he does not know beforehand what
kind of the sentences he will encounter. To decode the
sealed bit with collective measurements, he has to build
a data base which contains all sentences, pictures, and
even wave files for voice messages, etc., which can be en-
coded as N -bit strings. More importantly, learning the
sealed bit from pictures such as Fig. 1 is easy for human
beings with common senses, while if it is expected to be
done by machine, it has to have advanced power on im-
age identifying, pattern matching, and the capability to
understand the meaning of pictures, which may require
a large coverage of the knowledge of science and culture
in human history. It is actually impossible in practice
for a cheater to build such a data base for sufficiently
large values of N , even he has the most powerful quan-
tum computer. Thus his collective measurements cannot
be constructed. In this sense, such QBS can be viewed
as secure in practice.
With the above results of Ref. [9], building a QBC
protocol is straight forward. We can simply apply this
“practically secure” QBS protocol in Advanced Protocol
to obtain a QBC protocol. Note that the “practically
secure” QBS does not satisfy the strong unconditional
security condition. In fact, it is not unconditionally se-
cure in principle at all. Consequently, the resultant QBC
protocol is not unconditionally secure in principle. But
since the above QBS cannot be broken in practice, the
resultant QBC, whose security completely determined by
the QBS protocol being based on, is also secure in prac-
tice. Especially, when N is sufficiently large, there will
inevitably some sequences of bits which can be decoded
incidently as sentence like
“Go to the main library. Find the book on the
top − left of the last shelf . Turn to the last page,
and count how many times the letter K occurs
in the 3rd line......”
FIG. 1: A picture that may be used to seal a single bit in
practice.
Though such a sentence may lead to a deterministic value
of the sealed bits, it is less likely that the bit is really
sealed this way according to common sense. Therefore
a cheater can simply keep such sentences out of consid-
eration in a QBS protocol. Nevertheless, in our QBC
protocol we can allow Bob (again, please note that the
names Alice and Bob called in Advanced Protocol are
contrary to those in QBS) to seal such ridiculous sen-
tences (and even meaningless sentences which is literally
correct but may contain no clue for the sealed bit) with a
certain probability which is also agreed by Alice. When-
ever Alice decodes such a sentence in step (iii), she can
tell Bob to discard the corresponding data and chooses
another quantum register to measure. This will make
the protocol even more secure because if Alice wants to
cheat, her quantum computer will also have to deal with
all ridiculous and meaningless sentences, and judge which
sentences make sense. To accomplish this, it seems that
the quantum computer needs not only unlimited compu-
tational power to perform any kind of quantum opera-
tion and measurement, but also some extent of artificial
intelligence. So far there is even debate on whether hu-
man intelligence is computable or not [15]. Therefore the
security of our protocol is further guaranteed by those in-
computable elements. As a result, though the MLC no-
go theorem is considered to have put a serious drawback
on the development of the theoretical aspect of quantum
cryptography, in practice we can simply bypass this the-
orem and go ahead with this “practically secure” QBC
protocol. After all, the main purpose of developing cryp-
tography is to satisfy the application needs of human
society, which involve not only physical and mathemati-
cal principles, but also human behaviors. Cheating itself
is exactly a creation of human intervention. Therefore
it is natural to introduce more human-related issues into
cryptography to prevent cheating. Our finding makes it
possible to building any complicated QBC-based “post-
cold-war era” multi-party cryptographic protocols, like
6quantum coin tossing and quantum oblivious transfer,
and achieve better security in practice which cannot be
reached by their classical counterparts.
IV. FEASIBILITY
The present QBC protocol can be implemented as long
as the based-on QS protocol can be realized. As pointed
out in Ref. [9], the QS protocol requires merely Al-
ice to have the ability to prepare each single qubit in
a pure state, and Bob to perform individual measure-
ments. No entanglement/collective-measurement is re-
quired. Therefore the protocol may be demonstrated and
verified by the techniques available currently. Of course
for practical uses, storing quantum states for a long pe-
riod of time is still a technical challenge today. But this
is a tough issue that all QS protocols have to suffer. The
present protocol may be one of the simplest protocols of
its kind. More significantly, if such technique of storing
quantum states is not available, the attack strategy pro-
posed by the MLC no-go theorem that makes previous
QBC (e.g, Ref. [1]) insecure cannot be implemented ei-
ther; but on the other hand, whenever this tough techni-
cal problem is resolved in the future, the previous QBC
would be broken quite easily, while our QBC protocol
may still remain to be secure in practice.
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